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Abstract—Coronavirus disease 2019, or COVID-19 in 
short, is a zoonosis, i.e., a disease that spreads from animals to 
humans. Due to its highly epizootic nature, it has compelled 
the public health experts to deploy smartphone applications 
to trace its rapid transmission pattern along with the infected 
persons as well by utilizing the persons’ personally 
identifiable information. However, these information may 
summon several undesirable provocations towards the 
technical experts in terms of privacy and cyber security, 
particularly the trust concerns. If not resolved by now, the 
circumstances will affect the mass level population through 
inadequate usage of the health applications in the 
smartphones and thus liberate the forgery of a catastrophe for 
another COVID-19-like zoonosis to come. Therefore, an 
extensive study was required to address this severe issue. This 
paper has fulfilled the study mentioned above needed by not 
only discussing the recently designed and developed health 
applications all over the regions around the world but also 
investigating their usefulness and limitations. The trust 
defiance is identified as well as scrutinized from the viewpoint 
of an end-user. Several recommendations are suggested in the 
later part of this paper to leverage awareness among the 
ordinary individuals. 
Keywords—COVID-19, Trust, Awareness, Public Health, 
Smartphone Application, Personally Identifiable Information, 
Cyber Security, Recommendation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The zoonotic novel disease named coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) has changed the course of the global 
economy by putting constraints on individuals in daily 
commercial activities [1]. The highly contagious disease has 
potentially affected health facilities' capacity, even in 
developed countries where there are proven and robust 
healthcare systems [2]. To control and track the COVID-19 
trajectory, different administrations have utilized modern 
artificial intelligence (AI) based methods integrated with 5G 
technology and aerial drone devices for real-time COVID-
19 tracking [3][4]. With no specific vaccine or medicine for 
preventing or curing [5], currently, the best approach to 
avoid COVID-19 is not to get ourselves exposed to it [6]. 
Social distancing must be preserved between all, as recent 
studies [7] have shown that even an asymptomatic person 
may silently propagate the disease without raising any 
suspicion. 
This social distancing induces the public health 
specialists and workers to collaborate with the technical 
researchers to deploy the health applications (apps) to 
monitor people digitally, as the manual process is quite 
tedious to execute. Instead of gathering the personally 
identifiable information (PII) of the affected individual 
along with contact information for the last 2-3 weeks 
through extensive interviews, the health apps in 
smartphones can be an excellent alternative that have 
already been introduced, developed, and even deployed in 
some countries [8].  
Also, a majority of the people can use those apps using 
their smartphones not only in developed countries but also 
in the low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [9]; 
proper app usability has to be guaranteed by comparing in 
terms of development as well as confidentiality along with 
popularity among the end-users, and last but not least, user-
friendly interfaces. 
However, as the PII is stored in those apps, potential 
exposure of the PII may cause a violation of the user’s 
privacy. Moreover, the re-identification of a person can be 
done by only a few demographic data from the PII. Thus an 
individual may be targeted for a prospective cyber-attack or 
threat. 
This paper is organized as follows: section I introduces 
the concept; the terminologies are defined in section II, the 
relevant health apps and their functionalities are reviewed in 
section III. After that, the trust concerns are summarized in 
section IV and various recommendations are suggested in 
section V. The paper concludes with section VI advising 
future implementation as per the recommendations. 
II. DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES 
Before discussing the health-related apps and their 
features, fundamental trust issues concerning cyber security 
and privacy must be briefly introduced. The first one is the 
concept of the semi-honest model, the second one is the 
activity of a malicious actor, and the last one is the 
possibility of re-identification of a person to track and carry 
on cyber-attack or threat.  
In the real world, when a user is using smartphone apps 
during any type of epidemic situation for public health 
activities, some PII is saved into the storage of that 
application. Those app data can indicate where the users are 
going or whom the users are dealing with at any moment or 
even the current location of those users.  
Now, after those epidemic situations go away, still the 
PII remains saved in that particular storage which the user 
does not want to. For that, the user demands the health app 
that keeps the data for a specific timeframe, and after that, 
those data will be removed. For that, users need a fully 
trustable model or a full honest model where there will be 
no hackers or malicious actors who are going to misuse the 
databases of a user. Still, it is impossible to create a full 
honest model because we cannot assume that all the actors 
in a security model behave in a completely honest manner 
[10].  
However, that necessarily does not imply that a vast 
number of malicious actors are always active to harm the 
unsuspecting users all the time. Because even though they 
may wish to harm or cheat, they in fact, act rather in a semi-
honest way [10]. Therefore, we are proposing for a semi 
honest model to get rid of this problem of having trust. 
Semi honest party means the person or user who accepts 
all the terms and conditions of an application with the 
exception that it saves a list of all its intermediate 
computations. A semi-honest party always agrees with the 
“honest verifier” in the statement of empty-knowledge. To 
use smartphone apps for public health purposes, a user must 
register in it and share PII. In contrast, general malicious 
behavior may be non-changeable for many users, semi-
honest behavior may be useful for them. Using a semi-
honest model, users can be more reliable to use those contact 
tracing applications. 
In a malicious model, there is not an ideal condition 
stable here. The malicious model means where all 
participants are in the attacking mode. The first thing that 
must follow is that there should be no force to enter the 
protocol. There are many kinds of malicious behaviors. A 
possible malicious behavior can be the failure to start the 
execution. Or it can break the commission at any desired 
point in time. One of the targets of this model is, in a one on 
one party communication, not to give a third party the access 
to it. It is known to us that full fairness is not achievable. 
Another possible malicious behavior shows that when 
considering malicious rivals, it is unknown what their input 
to the protocol is. It means a malicious party can enter the 
protocol with a piece of open information, which may not 
equal to its “true” local input. There is no possibility of 
getting to know the actual input. From those discussions, we 
can see that it is not possible at all to stop the malicious 
actors. 
Behind a privacy model, there may be a significant 
number of threat actors. A threat actor means essence or 
person who has the intent to create an impact on the security 
and safety of others. In the cyber security and threat 
intelligence in a privacy model, the threat actors mean a 
massive number of any essences or persons either 
intentionally or unintentionally, who try to, and many times 
successfully execute malicious deeds against any industries. 
Many kinds of Cyber Threat Actors Have Different 
types of Motivations. We can specify those thread actors 
mainly in two types which are: malicious actors and 
nefarious actors.  Malicious actors are the ones who try to 
hamper the system whenever they get the chance. Nefarious 
actors, on the other hand, are the ones who are always 
present online and try to break the systems. In real-life, 
nefarious actors present in a privacy model are quite rare. 
Some malicious actors can still be present in a privacy 
model. Some examples of threat actors in a privacy model 
are given:  
Cyber-terrorist: Actors who attack via technology in 
cyber-space are called cyber-terrorist. For a bad political 
intention, outsider groups of actors are using cyber 
techniques to influence the public for an evil motive and try 
to change the political state. They try to create fear in the 
public's mind. There are no official reports filed against 
them because of their unknown identity. So that after doing 
this type of crime, they started to do more such as learn how 
to build a bomb, to recruit, have a meeting, and connect with 
like-minded individuals to spread their propaganda. 
Hacktivists: Hacking is not used for lousy intention all 
the time. Some organizations may hire several hackers to 
access any legal information for their business purpose. But 
sometimes a hacktivist is trying to embarrass celebrities 
politically or economically, to highlight human rights, 
waking up an organization to its sensitive things, to going 
after groups whose ideologies they disagree with. 
Hacktivists may steal and disseminate sensitive, proprietary, 
or, sometimes, classified data in the name of free speech. 
Other times, they aim to deny access to a particular service 
or website by conducting a distributed denial-of-service 
attack, essentially denying legitimate access by flooding a 
website with more traffic than it can handle, causing the site 
to crash.  
State-sponsored actors: receive direction, funding, or 
technical assistance from a nation-state to advance that 
nation’s interests. State-sponsored actors have stolen and 
infiltrated intellectual property, sensitive PII, and money to 
fund or further espionage and exploitation causes. In rare 
cases, these data appear for sale on underground black 
markets. Instead, these data are usually kept by the actors 
for their purposes. Although the data taken from data 
breaches might not always appear on underground markets, 
what can occur are the tools and guides for how to take 
advantage of the vulnerabilities that allowed access to the 
vulnerable systems in the first place. As an example, a 
researcher published the flaw that was used to penetrate 
Equifax, and within 24 hours, the information was posted to 
hacking websites and included in hacking toolkits. 
Cybercriminals: Cybercriminals are mainly profit-
driven and represent a lengthy period and worldwide threat. 
The target of the Cybercriminals is to sell the databases, 
hold for ransom, and otherwise absorb for financial gain. 
Cybercriminals may work individually or in groups to 
achieve their purposes [11]. 
Tracking: It generally means following the path or 
current location of delivery in real-time. Tracking is about 
gaining insights in real-time. A tracking app can, for 
example, determine a person’s current location using geo-
data (e.g., via GPS coordinates or radio cell location). If it 
additionally tracks who has been where and when it even 
allows creating detailed movement profiles. 
Tracing: On the other side of the coin, it means 
following the path of a delivery backward from its current 
point to where it started. Tracing is all about gaining insights 
in retrospect. A tracing app can be used, for example, to 
trace physical contacts between people. Using Bluetooth, a 
technology that enables digital devices to communicate with 
each other over short distances, it can measure the distance 
between smartphones based on the strength of the radio 
signals and thus detect encounters between users (proximity 
tracing). 
Demographic variables: They are defined as the 
independent variables as they cannot be manipulated. 
In research, demographic variables may be either 
categorical (e.g., gender, race, marital status, psychiatric 
diagnosis) or continuous (e.g., age, years of education, 
income, family size) [12]. 
De-identification:- The process of anonymizing datasets 
before sharing data. It has been the leading paradigm used 
in research and elsewhere to share data while preserving 
people's privacy. 
In today’s world, there is some modern data protection 
law, such as the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy 
Act (CCPA) consider that every person in a dataset has to 
be protected for the dataset to be considered anonymous. 
Data protection laws worldwide regarded as anonymous 
data as not personal data anymore.  
III. RELATED WORKS 
To secure their people from COVID-19, governments 
around the world have authorized the usage of a smartphone 
app designed and implemented by the local technical 
enterprises with/without the collaboration with the global 
tech giants. In this section, we will go by the regions, i.e., 
continents around the world. 
Starting alphabetically from Africa, the continent has 
seen its country Ghana implementing the GH COVID-19 
Tracker by crowd sourcing data to provide knowledge on 
the potential place of verified individuals to support health 
authorities to determine high-risk individuals. Crowd-
sourced data collection is a sharing method of making a 
data-set with the support of a massive group of the crowd 
and using a more secured semi-honest model to improve 
Crowd-sourcing. 
Next from Asia, more specifically, South Asia, India has 
developed an application named Aarogya Setu [13]. This 
application has got very good documentation [14]. Although 
there was no mention of disposal of data after the pandemic 
in the initial development, the updated privacy policy [15] 
states that all PII collected will be retained on the mobile 
device for 30 days from the date of the collection, after 
which, if it has not already been uploaded to the server, will 
be purged from the App. All PII uploaded to the server will, 
to the extent that such information relates to people who 
have not tested positive for COVID-19, will be purged from 
the server 45 days after being uploaded. All PII collected 
from persons who have tested positive for COVID-19 will 
be purged from the server 60 days after such persons have 
been declared cured of COVID-19.  
The following Table 1 is going to summarize the merits 
and demerits of several health apps spread over the 
numerous countries under the regions/continents. 
TABLE I.  TRUST IN HEALTH APPS: MERITS AND DEMERITS 
Region 
App features by region, country and name 
Country 
Name 
App Name Merits Demerits 
Africa Ghana 
GH 
COVID-19 
Tracker 
Crowd-
sourcing 
Security 
Model 
Asia 
India 
Aarogya 
Setu 
Well 
documented 
privacy 
policy 
Central 
server allows 
potential 
hacking of 
PII 
Malaysia 
My-
Sejahtera 
DP3T Data Policy 
Singapore 
TraceTo-
gether 
Secure 
Server 
Users can 
delete the 
app anytime 
Bahrain BeAware 
(not enough 
information) 
Documentati
on 
Tetamman Tetamman 
(not enough 
information) 
Power 
leakage 
Israel Hamagen 
Crosscheck 
GPS data 
with MOH 
data 
Documentati
on 
Europe 
Czech 
Republic 
e-Rouŝka 
Self-
explanatory 
Linguistic 
barrier 
Hungary VírusRadar 
High 
security 
(not enough 
information) 
Iceland 
Rakning   
C-19 
Supervised 
by Health 
Directorate 
(not enough 
information) 
Denmark Smittestopp 
Helpful FAQ 
information 
Battery 
drainage 
South 
America 
Colombia CoronApp 
Well 
documented 
No English 
version 
Oceania 
Australia COVIDsafe 
Well 
documented 
(not enough 
information) 
New 
Zealand 
Covid 
Tracer 
Maximum 
security 
unless user 
misuse 
User 
dependent 
action 
 
Moreover, Aarogya Setu [13] app alerts a user when they 
are nearby an infected person by using both Bluetooth and 
GPS. Several Data Science concepts, such as Classification, 
Association Rule Mining, and Clustering to analyze 
COVID-19 spread is being used [14]. As PII of numerous 
users of the app is stored on one server, this design 
potentially allows the potential malicious actors to hack the 
PII of users. 
Meanwhile, from Asia, more specifically from Southeast 
Asia, MySejahtera [16] in Malaysia needs to mention good 
documentation describing its data privacy. Another app 
from Malaysia, MyTrace [17] accepts a community-driven 
approach where participating devices exchange proximity 
information whenever an app detects another nearby device 
with MyTrace installed. As this app is based on the DP3T 
(Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) 
algorithm [18], it does not require location permissions. As 
long as location permissions are required, this app serves as 
a state surveillance apparatus, not a tool to assist in breaking 
the chain. 
On the other hand, Singapore has implemented 
TraceTogether with proper privacy statement [19]. The 
TraceTogether program enhances Singapore’s contact 
tracing efforts in the fight against COVID-19. It comprises 
the TraceTogether app and the TraceTogether token. The 
app was released on 20 March, while the token was rolled 
out on 28 June. The timeline is as follows: 1 April 2020 - 
Clarified the collection of anonymized analytics data, 1 June 
2020 - Clarified the collection of identification details and 
usage of data for contact tracing, 3 Sep 2020 - Included the 
TraceTogether Token in the Privacy Safeguards. Both the 
App and the Token can be used voluntarily, and it facilitates 
the contact tracing process. 
With the user’s consent, it exchanges encrypted and 
anonymized Bluetooth signals with nearby TraceTogether 
devices, and the Bluetooth data after 25 days are 
automatically deleted. This allows users to be informed if 
users were in prolonged physical proximity with an infected 
person. They are committed to safeguarding users’ privacy 
and will only use users’ data for contact tracing purposes. 
They store limited data. The only identity data they store is: 
users’ contact/mobile number, users’ identification details, 
a random anonymized User ID. When users sign up, a 
random User ID is generated and associated with users’ 
contact/mobile number and identification details. Users’ 
contact/mobile number, identification details, and User ID 
are stored in a secure server, and never shown to the public. 
They do not collect data about users’ GPS location. 
TraceTogether uses Bluetooth to approximate users’ 
distance to other TraceTogether devices. They do not collect 
data about users’ GPS locations. Neither do they collect data 
about users’ WiFi or mobile network. Data about devices 
near users do not reveal personal identities. When users are 
close to another TraceTogether device, both devices use 
Bluetooth to exchange a Temporary ID. This Temporary ID 
is generated by encrypting the User ID with a private key 
held by the Ministry of Health (MOH), Singapore. It can 
only be decrypted by MOH, and does not reveal your 
identity or the other person's identity. Data about devices 
near users is stored securely on users’ device and will only 
be shared with MOH if users test positive for COVID-19, 
for the sole purpose of contact tracing. The anonymized 
Bluetooth data stored on your device after 25 days are 
automatically deleted. Therefore the right to be forgotten as 
per GDPR is preserved. Other third-party services will not 
be able to track users’ identities. The Temporary ID that 
users’ device exchanges with nearby devices are refreshed 
at regular intervals. The lack of a persistent identifier means 
it is impossible for third parties to identify or track users. 
Users may request for users’ identification data to be deleted 
on their servers unless users’ proximity data has already 
been uploaded as a confirmed case. They will then delete 
users’ contact/mobile number, identification details and 
User ID from their server. This renders all meaningless data 
that users’ device has exchanged with other devices, 
because that data will no longer be associated with the users. 
Users’ data will only be used for COVID-19 contact 
tracing. Any data shared with MOH will only be used solely 
for contact tracing of persons possibly exposed to COVID-
19. TraceTogether will only communicate with nearby 
devices for a limited time. They will only use TraceTogether 
for contact tracing. Once contact tracing ceases, users will 
be prompted to disable the functionality of the 
TraceTogether App or return/dispose of the Token. For the 
App, users can also disable its functionality any time by 
turning the App's Bluetooth permissions off or deleting the 
App. If contact tracing is required for a future outbreak, 
users will be prompted to enable permissions, or users can 
reinstall the App. They use anonymized data to improve 
TraceTogether. The TraceTogether app collects 
anonymized data about users’ phone and app, e.g., device 
model, app version, etc. to help it improve and provide a 
better user experience. 
Next from Asia, particularly from the Middle-East area, 
Bahrain uses an application named BeAware [20]. This 
application needs to have good documentation mentioning 
the data privacy issue. Tetamman [21] in Saudi Arabia 
always uses GPS and Bluetooth to cause power leakage, i.e., 
battery drain. It takes much control over users’ smartphones 
as well. Need to mention good documentation about data 
privacy. Hamagen (or “Protector” in Hebrew) [22] in Israel 
cross-checks the GPS history of patient's mobile phones 
with historical geographic data of patients from the Ministry 
of Health (MOH). 
Meanwhile, from Europe, Czech Republic is using an 
application named e-Rouŝka [23] which has a proper 
documentation [24] with a self-explanatory video as well. 
But those are in Czech language. So it has a linguistic 
barrier. These kinds of information should be stored using 
international languages, such as English. In Hungary, 
VírusRadar [25] is a mobile app which implemented for 
Apple iOS and also for Android. It provides the highest 
security standards, full control over our personal data, and 
also guarantees privacy protection. It is generally using the 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) protocol to detect faceless 
encrypted contacts [26] which are highly secured. 
After that, from Europe, more specifically from Northern 
Europe, Rakning C-19 app [27] in Iceland collects the GPS 
location of the users’ phone and stores information locally 
on the device. If the phone owner is diagnosed with the 
Covid-19 disease, then he is asked by the Health Directorate 
to share the location data for contact tracing to mark out the 
individuals that might need to go into quarantine. 
Meanwhile, Smittestopp [28] in Northern Europe, more 
precisely, Denmark, always turns GPS and Bluetooth on and 
drains the device battery. Frequently asked questions (FAQ) 
section is helpful, but not enough proper documentation was 
found regarding the data usage policy. Linguistic barrier is 
also an issue. 
After that, from South America, Colombia uses 
CoronApp [29]. The documentation of this application will 
be found in [30]. Nothing has been mentioned about data 
privacy and further disposal of data, so it needs to mention 
the data privacy of an individual. Also, it needs to make an 
English version of documentation and existing video. 
Finally, from Oceania, Australia is using an application 
named COVIDsafe [31]. It already has documentation [32]. 
Another country from this continent, New Zealand uses NZ 
Covid Tracer App [33] for preventing and controlling their 
corona situation. This is based on user interaction. A user 
needs to share his/her credential with the application if 
he/she is found to have COVID-19. This is pretty much 
based on users. If they don’t want to share credentials, 
nothing can be done. But it has better data privacy though 
it’s not as effective as other contact tracing applications. It 
has two-factor authentication. Data is encrypted before sent. 
Finding this app is difficult, and it has poor design. 
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCERNS 
 The following paragraphs have summarized the trust 
concerns detected and categorized by our through analytical 
procedure. 
However, from those numerous anonymous datasets, a 
person can be identified using a demographic variable, 
which create a big concern about the privacy and ethical use 
of those data. Recently the collection and subsequent sale of 
Facebook data to Cambridge Analytica has made an 
enormous trust issue. 
 In 2016, journalists re-identified politicians in an 
anonymized browsing history dataset of three million 
German citizens, uncovering their medical information and 
their sexual preferences. A few months before, the 
Australian Department of Health publicly released de-
identified medical records for 10% of the population only 
for researchers to re-identify them six weeks later. Before 
that, studies had shown that de-identified hospital discharge 
data could be re-identified using basic demographic 
attributes and that diagnostic codes, year of birth, gender, 
and ethnicity could uniquely identify patients in genomic 
studies data. Finally, researchers were able to uniquely 
identify individuals in anonymized taxi trajectories in NYC, 
bike sharing trips in London, subway data in Riga, and 
mobile phone and credit card datasets [34][35]. 
There has some model on re-identification of a person 
from an anonymous dataset. Quasi-identifier is one of it.it 
consists one or more quasi-identifier which called qids. 
Using this model a person can be identified from an 
anonymous dataset.  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Applications which are being used in different countries 
are not creating documentations properly. If an application 
has proper documentation, then people will feel more 
comfortable to use that application because they already 
know how the application in exactly working.  
To increase its trust issues they should make a proper 
documentation and a self-explanatory video to let the people 
know about the working procedure of the application. 
Moreover, linguistic barrier is a major concern in 
European countries. Many foreign personals living in 
European countries may not speak or read the native 
language, so having app tutorial in the native language 
causes inconvenience. This also applies for foreign 
volunteers working in developing countries. 
Aware mass level people regarding security model such 
that they know that not all actors are malicious and there are 
very few nefarious actors. Also, a pure honest model is not 
possible, so caveat emptor (Latin, meaning “let the buyer 
beware”) is the best policy in a semi-honest model. 
Moreover, even though the re-identification is 
mathematically possible, proper data management can 
reduce the threat significantly. 
Furthermore, as every contact tracing application is using 
a centralized database to store data, if the distributed ledger 
is used, it will be safer for the data stored. If done so, in case 
of malicious attacks, the actor will be able to retrieve maybe 
a part of the database rather than the whole database. 
Therefore, Blockchain technology can play a vital role in 
this regard. It ensures maximum security with a shared 
ledger system, which makes it the best match to address the 
issues raised by the centralized systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Researchers have identified different psychological 
factors associated with human behavior during this COVID-
19 pandemic and the previous disease outbreak, such as 
panic buying and patient history hiding [36][37]. These 
control the individual mental health of the entire 
community, society and professionals, such as health care 
workers and persons working in clinics [38][39]. Therefore, 
it is highly essential to study an individual's trust issues 
using digital health monitoring technologies, such as health 
apps. 
If the near future does not solve the trust issues, it will 
cost more as people will be reluctant to use health apps and 
make a pandemic to come a much worse one. Further 
studies and implementations have to be carried out as per 
the suggestions presented in the recommendations section. 
Only then we can ensure a better strategy to fight back future 
zoonosis or such. 
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